Introduction dimension (and its economics tradition, from Schumpeter '1' through Nelson/Winter) (see, e.g, Nonaka, Toyama 2002) (this tradition has emphasized the instrumental dimension of institutionalization of coordination and organization forms more strongly). Strategy, power, path creation, and complex interrelatedness of firms may combine into cumulativity, lock in, adverse firm selections, and even whole populations of big costpushers (e.g., Dosi, Gianetti, Toninelli (eds.) 1992; Hodgson 1993; Pitelis 1998; Stack, Gartland 2003) . And with the growth of the knowledge economy and the increasing requirement of a 'socially embedded knowledge', the neoclassical organizational dichotomy becomes an increasingly pointless paradigm of organizational research (e.g.,
Hodgson 2005).
Thus, the neoclassical dichotomy, although still most virulent in the mainstream, does not appear to be appropriate for analyzing the manifold observed forms of business interdependence, coordination, and organization. In fact, real-world economic structures and processes are reflected in a virtually infinite universe of complex models considering interactive agents, with diverse resulting processes and emergent structures, generated already by even rather simple initial structures (see again, e.g., Foley 1998; Watts 1999 ).
Neoclassical ideal 'markets' with isolated individual agents (including firm hierarchies)
then would represent just a special case somewhere at the fringes of that universe.
In times of de-regulation and 'dis-embedding' of the 'markets', of global spatial and functional fragmentation of value-added chains in the face of complex products, and, thus, required technological interoperability and net-technologies, interdependent decision-making and coordination and cooperation problems have come to dominate the economy (see, e.g., Ruigrok, van Tulder 1995; Rycroft, Kash 1999; Pratt 1997; Elsner 2005) . Instances of informally institutionalized cooperative forms to overcome uncertainty and opportunism are local clusters with their historically learned, largely priceindependent, stable and long-run interrelations as well as more or less formal strategic networks (see, e.g., Elsner 2000 Elsner , 2009b . Hierarchical and network forms typically combine into hub&spoke network forms. However, none of these are 'hybrids' in the sense of the neoclassical dichotomy (e.g., Baudry, Gindis 2005) . This is all well-known among heterodox schools since their intense criticisms of transaction cost economics during the 1990s and 2000s (e.g., Winter 1993; Groenewegen (ed.) 1996; Amin, Hausner (eds.) 1997; Nonaka, Toyama 2002; Hodgson 2005; Dietrich, Krafft 2008) .
Against this background, this paper starts with (1) a short reconsideration of that conventional organizational dichotomy. We will take the ideal 'market-hierarchy' dimension to serve as an organizational baseline, although theoretically sterile and empirically void. Therefore, we will develop, in addition, (2) an organizational dimension that we position orthogonally to that baseline dimension and which reflects the degree of interactively learned institutionalization of cooperation, including cluster and network forms, i.e., the value of the instrumental dimension of an informally emerging institution.
Thus, a two-dimensional organizational space will be established wherein 'market' and 'hierarchy' receive some real-world significance and meaning as forms with instrumental institutional content. Its new 'attractor' is ideal, learned, institutionalized cooperation, which provides the third 'corner stone' of a triangle conception, in addition to the corners 'Market' and 'Hierarchy', the new one called (instrumental) Ideal Institutionalized Cooperation/Network. While still ideal and empirically void at its corners and edges, this frame can serve as a heuristic to better explore both theoretical and real-world organizational forms. This Organizational Triangle will subsequently be exposed to (3) real-world organizational forms in some short case studies that will illustrate the conception's applicability and its ability not only to reflect evolutionary-institutional theory of the firm but to help characterize, allocate, and compare different real-world organizational phenomena and forms.
The Conventional Transaction-Cost Conceptualization of Organizational Forms: The Organizational Dichotomy and Its Critique
The neoclassical approach to comparative allocation, coordination, and organization forms has been developed from the 'transaction cost' approach (Coase 1937 (Commons 1934, Vol. I, 52-74, 336-42;  see also, e.g., Pitelis 1998 
Williamson's Affirmation of the Dichotomy
Williamson's further elaboration of the issue has more or less confirmed and reinforced that limitation. Although he discusses a broad range of influences on transaction costs, he never actually moves to complex organizational structures and processes beyond 'rational' marginal optimization and equilibrium. Those diverse issues mentioned above are always made commensurable to, and in fact subsumed under, the exclusive transaction-cost dimension and the established organizational dichotomy. This holds for both why transaction costs matter and the main components of transaction cost (see, e.g., Williamson, 1975 Williamson, , 2003 see also, e.g., Pyatt 1978) .
For example, a key factor is asset specificity of investment (in both physical and human capital). Due to bounded rationality of the agents and their need to assume opportunistic behavior of the exchange partner, a potential for hold-up problems exists.
These will be anticipated and be taken into account when entering a relation. Contracts then are the tool to cope with this, but their inevitable incompleteness prevents addressing all potential problems and conflicts, particularly those arising from asymmetric information, mutual bounded rationality, or mutual 'strong' uncertainty. Vertical integration (enhancing hierarchy) is offered here to be the only solution.
However, bounded rationality, strong uncertainty, and incomplete contracts may also open the way for more complex forms of coordination, i.e., an elaboration of evolutionary process, institutional emergence, learned institutionalization of trust and cooperation, and related relational contracting to reduce (mutual) moral hazard and thus transaction costs. Although this has been addressed by Williamson (e.g., Williamson 1981 ) it has not been elaborated. His discussion remains focused on governance structures to be aligned with, and neatly reducible to, transaction costs and their 'rational' economizing so that 'the firm' remains 'something to be derived from comparative transaction cost considerations' (Williamson 1996, 11) .
Transaction Costs in a Complexity Perspective
It certainly is worthwhile identifying specific transaction costs and attempting to reduce prohibitive transaction costs, as present in the cases of strong uncertainty, namely initial strong strategic uncertainty, reduced to levels where agents become capable of action, particularly innovative action. This, however, will be feasible only as trusting and correlated (joint, collective) action. The very concept of transaction costs thus may easily include situations that blow up the whole neoclassical organizational dichotomy as in the case of strong uncertainty with prohibitive, action-blocking information costs (see, e.g., Groenewegen 1996, 9) .
Overcoming complex problems in evolutionary processes will be contributing to reducing transaction costs, and economizing on transaction costs would be a byproduct of solving more fundamental problems of strategic uncertainty. (Nelson, Winter 1982, Ch. 5) .
Abstract Vanishing Points
Nevertheless, these two highly abstract, theoretically absurd, and empirically void organizational principles of a completely chaotic decentralized structure ('market') on the one hand and a 'pure' structure of 'top' and 'bottom' positions ('hierarchy') on the other may only serve as 'vanishing points' in the organizational space to be developed below.
Overall, the very essence of a realist, complex setting is still not properly theorized in the dimension of the 'degree of vertical integration' or 'value chain-length'. The integration of complexity, process, and institutionalization, reflected in the (informal)
'institutionalized cooperation' or the (more formal) organizational 'network' dimension, acknowledges the firm as a strategic agent and gives room for it to fill that role in various organizational ways in its recurrent interactions with other agents. This will allow for comparative empirical analyses of various real-world organizational forms. Of course, we will have to leave these 'pure' forms as soon as we consider a world of direct interdependencies, strong (strategic) uncertainty, dilemma-prone collectivity and coordination problems, resulting complexity, evolutionary process, interactively learned informal coordination, and emergence of institutionalized cooperation (including formal or informal organizational forms of networking).
Immediately beyond the 'bottom line', real-world forms apply that, however, are fundamentally different from the 'dismantled' neoclassical bottom-line forms in that they are forms cum institutionalizations in a complex environment. To be sure, real-world forms close to the neoclassical bottom line will have small values of instrumental institutionalization but, logically, high values of the ceremonial dimension of institutionalization. The latter, in turn, implies, as mentioned, market and hierarchy failures such as mutual blockage, lock-in, non-action, incapability of coordination and collective action, due to power-and status-based forms of institutionalization.
Dilemma-Prone Complexity as an Everyday Problem
The relevance of the collective-good/social dilemma problem can be seen in its ubiquity as an everyday problem as we have argued elsewhere (e.g., Elsner 2009a). There is in fact a collective-good problem involved in every single economic decision, even in the most simple supermarket purchase, surrounding any technological coordination problem as well, Generally, agents in a strongly individualistic culture may be incited to 'defect' in manifold ways, and will do so as far as the situation is not fully governed by institutions, including memory, monitoring and transparency, reputation building, and related sanctioning (if not governed at all by formal hierarchical control).
Along these lines, we have argued elsewhere that any production, information, and innovation system, under conditions of fragmented value-added chains, net-technologies, and the collective-good character of information, can be modeled as a system of mutual externalities, collectivities, and cumulativity, such that it can be reconstructed as a social dilemma in which any transaction or simple coordination problem is embedded (Elsner 2005 ).
However, the dilemma structure often exists only 'in the background', while the observable social surface is dominated by its solutions, i.e., institutionalized arrangements.
These may be 'instrumental' (i.e., problem-solving) or ceremonial or 'locked-in' on an inferior technology, or even completely mutually blocked through general free-riding and non-action, and this may not even be realized as such by the agents who perhaps do not know better. The 'surface' of institutionalized everyday solutions (including lock-in and 'non-action') typically is more easily visible than the complex problem structure in the background and its alternative potentialities.
Common individualist decision-making, thus, in an interdependent world, may lead to inferior results, and ideal 'markets', or close-to-ideal de-regulated real markets, and the prices resulting in them, may fail to generate and diffuse the shared knowledge and expectations required for some 'reasonable' outcome, i.e., overcoming the dilemma. A solution (superior to mutual individualist blockage or lock-in) then may require a 'higher' form of rationality than the non-embedded market can provide by itself.
Coordination Problems and Social Dilemmas, 'Coordination' and 'Cooperation', 'Social Rules' and 'Institutions'
That 'higher' form of rationality allowing for shared knowledge and informal coordination will be an institutionalization of cooperation through a learned and 'habitualized'
(habituated) social institution, in the face of a dominant incentive 'hyper-rationally' to defect. In a dilemma-prone, decentralized system, the dilemma problem can be overcome, if not through formal and authoritarian mechanisms, only by 'habitualized' and 'semiconscious' behavior. This is because the dilemma, with its dominant incentive to defect, is a more severe problem than a simple coordination problem (e.g., a road traffic problem, typically solved by simple coordination through a simple social rule). The coordination, then, has to assume the specific form of cooperation, i.e., coordination with sacrificing the potential short-run 'rational' one-shot extra gain. The simple social rule then has to become an institution, i.e., rule plus endogenous sanction. In this way and with this terminology it typically is depicted in prisoners' dilemma supergame modeling (see, e.g., to open up room for joint learning, mutually adapting expectations, and, with this, a pathdependent cumulative process to solve (or not) the ubiquitous dilemma problem. This also implies multiple equilibria (fixed points, attractors) among which the system may fluctuate. This also applies to the organizational space to be developed in the following.
Coordination Forms Cum Institutions: The Organizational Space
'Markets' and hierarchies, in an interdependent world, thus need to be embedded in learned problem-solving and stabilizing institutional arrangements in order to become workable and problem-solving in any meaningful societal sense.
A de-regulated 'market', for instance, with little instrumental-institutional embedding, typically is the largest enemy of a market that has any meaningful positive (instrumental) effect, because of its unleashed immanent tendencies towards power concentration, self-abolition, adverse distribution, trust deterioration, reduced innovation capacity, lock-ins, and, in the extreme, mutual blockages of any instrumental action, as we currently observe in the severest financial and economic crisis the world has ever seen.
Similarly, in the real world with its fragmented, deregulated, uncertain, and turbulent environment where much information and innovation has assumed a public-good character and can not completely be appropriated, even the most powerful hierarchies turn out to be incapable of effectively dealing with the strong uncertainty involved (as we also can observe in the contemporary global economic crisis). Hierarchies thus are forced to downsize while, in a double movement, they also have to accumulate ever more power in order to maintain some control over their increasingly turbulent environment. Hierarchical power in the global corporate economy is exerted nowadays through the command over extensive global supplier networks, thereby multiplying the number of employees that 'hub' hierarchies can command beyond their in-house labor force, i.e., hub&spoke networks.
Therefore, the real-world organizational dimension builds upon direct interdependence and direct interaction processes, cumulatively learned and habituated forms of cooperation to overcome social dilemmas and solve coordination problems. This applies to instrumental institutionally embedded markets, instrumentally 'routinized'
hierarchies (where routines/institutions are more the learned 'gene' rather than just the 'truces' of an organization, to use Nelson's and Winter's (1982) 'routines dichotomy'), and instrumental cluster and network forms of institutionalized coordination, the latter emerging from markets and among hierarchies. For an illustration, see Figure 1 .
Degree of instrumental institutionalization of cooperation in a complex, uncertain, and dilemma-prone environment Degree of vertical integration or relative lengths of value-added chains inside and outside hierarchy As soon as complexity and resulting informal institutions (i.e., informal cooperation) have to be considered, a real-world coordination form will lay within the organizational space rather than a hybrid in the neoclassical organizational dichotomy. Put differently, the neoclassical dichotomy receives theoretical and empirical meaning only if we allocate empirical coordination and cooperation forms within the space that we are developing here.
The new, and again 'ideal' (although complexity-based), corner or attractor point represents instrumental ideal institutionalized cooperation which reflects the collective solution of complex problem structures and processes, an institution to yield coordination through cooperation. To be sure, this is not a morally 'superior' or somehow more i.e., not without elements of hierarchy and 'market', in this framework either.
As soon as it comes to the operationalization of the vertical scale we may refer to the well and long elaborated institutionalist theory of instrumental value, or Social Value
Principle which provides sets of criteria to measure the instrumental content of systems of institutionalization (see Tool, 1985 Tool, , 1986 .
Note that with institutionalized coordination and cooperation breaking down, we move down the vertical line (the perpendicular) of the Triangle. Here, while the instrumental dimension becomes weaker and the ceremonial dimension dominant, we may easily apply another important institutionalist approach, the theory of institutional change, assuming a process of gradual ceremonially encapsulation of learned instrumental knowledge (see Bush 1987 ). In such more or less instrumentally disembedded and ceremonially encapsulated hierarchy and disembedded and encapsulated markets all kinds of failures and deficiencies will indeed become dominant forms in the real world (as, again, the current global crises strikingly demonstrate). Empirical coordination forms then would come close to the ideal neoclassical bottom line without, however, becoming identical with the abstract ideals.
The Organizational Triangle as a Heuristic
In all, within the two-dimensional organizational space that may be constructed this way, we can define three ideal attractor points (corners).
This Organizational Triangle may be considered the simplest reflection of complexity which seems to be reasonable beyond the over-simplistic neoclassical dichotomy. As such it is intended to serve as a heuristic to analyze real-world organizational forms, i.e., to characterize, locate, and compare real organizational forms (see Figure 2 ). In addition, we may assume hybrids not only between the two vanishing points of the neoclassical dichotomy but between each two of the three attractor points. In this way, the Triangle can be further specified.
For example, (spatial) clusters, are defined here as informal ('functional') coordination forms, reflected by repeated, relatively stable, lasting, and relatively priceresistant exchange relations, in this way being some hybrid between ideal cooperation and spontaneous decentralized private interaction systems where prices play some role ('markets') (for a definition and discussion of clusters, see, e.g., Elsner 2000 Elsner , 2009b .
Ideal clusters, therefore, will be allocated somewhere 'halfway' between 'ideal cooperation' and 'ideal market'.
Similarly, hub&spoke networks are defined here as some more formal and deliberately contracted ('strategic') forms of multilateral, project bound, and often fix-term cooperation (often emerging from cluster interactions which would mean a move through the middle of the Triangle from left to right). Such networks share their more formal (and hierarchical) character with hierarchies. Hub&spoke networks that, in reality, have come to dominate the global corporate economy, where big corporate hierarchies command many suppliers and service providers, are the prototype of a hybrid between 'ideal hierarchy' and an informal 'ideal network'. They are to be located 'halfway' between ideal hierarchy and ideal institutionalized cooperation (see Figure 2 ; for a definition of networks and a two-stage model of cluster-network development, see, e.g., Elsner 2000 Elsner , 2005 Elsner , 2009b .
Also, since the neoclassical 'bottom-line' corner 'ideal market' must be understood as a perfect atomistic structure with a maximum length of value-added chains, cars, for instance, could be produced just with a telephone by which the entrepreneur would conclude thousands of spot contracts (with realtors, construction people, suppliers, service providers, laborers, etc.) every day. And if 'ideal hierarchy' (without 'markets' and institutions), in contrast, could be understood as a monopolistic global mega-corporation, embracing the whole value chain (for one good, at least) in its vertically integrated structure, then the 'bottom-line' edge would, 'halfway', display something like a 'midsized' length value chain (or 'mid-sized' vertical integration), i.e., something like a 'market' with medium-sized firms (which would display the usual failures of disembedded markets as explained).
Finally, an ideal, informal, learned, cooperative open-source network without any hierarchy and with no price-based exchange, as indicated, would be an example of the ideal institutionalized-cooperation corner of the triangle.
In this way, the Organizational Triangle can be specified not only through its two dimensions and its three corners but also through four ideal reference coordination forms three of which are 'half way points' on its edges.
Case Studies: Real-World Corporate Hub&Spoke and Open-Source Networks Within the Triangle

Real-World Phenomena
This section will tentatively apply the Organizational Triangle to real-world phenomena.
Large hierarchies, for instance, that dominate and rule the global corporate economy have reduced their internal value chains in order to reduce costs (see, e.g., Choi, Hong 2002) but have at the same time used and increased power to reduce complexity, control their environment, get command over an extended, often multiplied workforce, distributed all over the world, and stabilize their expectations. In the neoclassical dichotomy, this would mean reducing and extending the firms' value chain at the same time. In difference to this 
A Simple Metric for Survey Data
We may apply the Triangle as a heuristic in a first step in a most simple way. In two case studies, we have interviewed CEOs, managing directors, and leading experts of the hub firm and its suppliers in a prominent hub&spoke manufacturing network and some leading managers and regional experts of the open-source network of the Linux community. We have surveyed their self-assessments of their organizational forms with regard to the space given by the Triangle. Specifically, we have asked a series of questions that were considered to characterize typical relations, i.e., formal structures, informal governance rules, and performance, with respect to each of the three ideal forms and with special consideration of the instrumental and ceremonial contents of rules, routines, and institutions.
Questions included addressed the spatial and social proximity among, and recurrence and frequency of personal contacts (interactions) with, the same agents, the role of prices in the interactions with other agents, the degree of hierarchy among the agents (relations, and specific contractual stipulations, of authority, power, control, and command among the agents), the degrees of learning, voluntariness, trust, reciprocity, and priceless exchanges, knowledge sharing, 'gifts' of knowledge and innovation, the time spans between giving and receiving, and the efficacy of specific performances of the coordination and organization forms in question. The many statements from long and intensive questionnaire-based interviews have been evaluated in a text analysis according to whether they match with the characteristics of 'ideal market', 'ideal hierarchy', or 'ideal institutionalized cooperation/informal network'.
Each statement clearly expressing a tendency towards one of the three poles of the Triangle counted as one point. In a simple arithmetic transformation we have combined the answers that were respectively related to the three ideal forms into a metric that determines the location of the respective coordination forms on a rough grid in the Triangle. In this way, we have gained some tentative application of the Triangle through some preliminary comparative subjective data. 
As can easily be seen, we have normalized both the 'bottom-line' (between the poles 'ideal market' and 'ideal hierarchy') and the height of the Triangle to one (hence the second summands in equations (1) and (2) To give a simple numerical example, assume a supplier representative has given 14 usable statements regarding coordination forms during the interview, 3 in favor of 'market', 6 for hierarchy, 5 for ideal network cooperation. Equts. (1) - (3) The famous Linux 'community' or network as its prototype is characterized by relationships among its members that are considerably less based on hierarchy and more on informal learned institutionalized cooperation including reciprocity and gift exchange.
Knowledge seems to be successfully governed more as a collective good. Digital microelectronic information has virtually become subject to non-exclusion, rendering information a full-fledged collective good ubiquitously open to individualistic free-riders.
According to the extensive and still growing literature on Linux (see, e.g., Foray
1988; Cohendet et al. 2001; McKelvey 2001) , the network structure is characterized by several minor 'hubs' that typically just moderate the exchange processes among the participants without being able to put any pressure on them. The network seems to have triggered fast exchange, joint learning, effective routinization and institutionalization of cooperation, emerging from 'dense' repeated interaction.
Mailing lists and news sites frequently report on programmers who have earned professional credit and personal trust. Thus the reputation mechanism seems to be an indicator of a long-run rationality in the theoretical framework of a prisoners' dilemma supergame, specifically in a stochastic population approach where active partner selection is possible and will be based on monitoring and reputation chains (cf., e.g., Elsner 2005 Elsner , 2009a ).
The 'Linux-paradigm' can be seen as an approach towards 'ideal, institutionalized cooperation' in the Triangle. However, as a real-world coordination form it obviously cannot be expected to perfectly conform to the ideal. Having tentatively located real-world organizational forms in the Triangle, a short consideration of their comparative combinations of properties may be in order.
Knowledge Sharing, Common Information Management, and Network Governance
A point that is noteworthy stems from the fact that the organization of production in supplier networks to meet complexity and cost-reduction requirements makes it difficult for assemblers to pursue proprietary innovations. Since fragmented value-added chains, information and innovation as collectivities, required standardization, and network forms of sourcing and supplying largely prevent keeping innovations as a business secret ('inappropriability' of investment in knowledge creation), especially where suppliers serve more than one assembler, a change in the companies' strategies may be required for both keeping up their competitive advantage and high efficacy and performance in a regional, national, and societal sense. Corresponding 'progressive' value-added chain and supplier network governance rules would require levels of learned trust that allow for the outflow of positive externalities from the firm in question to other agents and reverse inflows from them so that profits may be reduced by inevitable outflows but will be compensated by inflows. In this way, the social dilemmas of production, innovation, and information generation involved could be 'managed'. intense cooperation between a number of suppliers of MBUSI that were more independent and located further away from the hub indicates that suppliers indeed may be willing to collaborate if they are given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, it was reported by several suppliers of MBUSI that they receive orders not from their own headquarters and not even from MBUSI at Tuscaloosa but from the Daimler headquarters in Germany.
Finally, the contracts applied by Daimler to its suppliers stipulate that they can be replaced on an annual basis. Long-term and trust-based contractual agreements, in contrast, could not only lower transaction costs but reduce uncertainty for all, extend planning horizons and thus make investments in interactive learning and institutionalization of trust and cooperation rational. Stable institutionalized relations and expectations may be expected to motivate proactive and creative behavior of suppliers with a positive impact on the innovative and learning capacity of the network.
Conclusion
The Organizational Triangle, in its institutional dimension and cooperative vanishing point, reflects complexity, social dilemma, strong uncertainty, recurrent interactions, evolutionary process, and possibly interactive learning, emergent institutions of cooperation, reciprocity, stabilization of trust, common knowledge, reduced transaction costs, and high performance. Evolutionary process, however, may also lead to a downward spiraling, possibly ending in lock-in, collective inability of action, mutual blockage, distrust, and Therefore, in a world of ubiquitous interdependence, coordination and cooperation problems, the dominant belief in the full accountability of stand-alone firm hierarchies, with their strategies of ever more power exertion to deal with increasing global turbulence, and of self-regulating 'markets', however dis-embedded, de-regulated, and ceremonially dominated, does not appear to be economically sustainable both for business and the economy as a whole. For instance, in the MBUSI case, trying to keep innovations within the boundaries of the firm appeared to cause high and rising contractual costs.
Consideration of comparative location in the Triangle, thus, suggests that taking on open-source experience in manufacturing might improve, initialize, accelerate, stabilize, and broaden innovation, not only for the economy as a whole and not only for the independent small and medium-sized firms involved but in the last instance even for the big powerful global corporations.
Obviously, this analysis, and particularly the transfer of best socio-economic experience into a broad range of industries, would have to be combined with proper apply evolutionary-institutional analysis, including the institutional dichotomy, the social value principle, and the theory of institutional change, in the field of organizational forms.
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